On November 16, 2026, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued an interim final rule (“IFR”) imposing new export controls on advanced chips destined for data centers that provide significant remote computing capacity to companies headquartered in China and other countries of concern, and formally rescinding Biden-era restrictions on advanced chips used for artificial intelligence that BIS had previously been instructed not to enforce
BIS has now also clarified that in addition to rescinding the AI Diffusion Rule, it is also revoking a final rule from October 2024 that created a new export authorization for data centers as part of its Validated End User program.
According to a BIS statement released on the same day, the rule is designed to prevent the circumvention of “existing restrictions on access to sensitive American technology... through remote computing arrangements involving data centers in third countries.” The rule notes that such computing power “can be used to train and run advanced SI models capable of supporting military- and intelligence-related activities that could threaten U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.”
The rule also creates an end-use control on advanced AI semiconductors in cases where exporters have “knowledge” that chips will be used in data centers that provide direct or indirect access to a significant volume of computing power to or for an entity based in a country subject to U.S. arms embargoes. This group of countries, known as D:5, includes China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
In addition, the IFR also creates a destination-based license requirement for advanced Super Intelligence (“SI”) items for destinations BIS considers having an unacceptable risk of diversion: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand.
Heightened Diligence on Exports of Covered Chips Is Necessary
Commerce has stressed the importance of exporter due diligence, noting that, “Data centers, foreign foundries, and chip exporters are required to perform robust due diligence on their customers, including any direct or indirect ownership or control by persons in Country Group D:5 or Macau, as part of complying with this new control.” Since the control turns on “knowledge,” diligence should cover who will ultimately access the computing power, including where the customer and its ultimate parent are headquartered.
BIS may also notify a party, by specific notice, that a license is required for a particular end user or transaction. Once the party is informed, a license requirement applies.
Commerce has also clarified that if circumstances later change, for example, where an exporter learns that a data center using the chips gives direct or indirect access to significant computing power to an entity headquartered in a D:5 or a high-risk country, or whose parent entity is headquartered there, a license can be required. Once the exporter has that knowledge, any further export, reexport or transfer of the chips, including in-country transfers, may need BIS authorization – this holds even if the original shipment needed no license.
Additional Scope and Licensing Considerations
The IFR further imposes export controls when the U.S. advanced chips have been incorporated into a foreign-made item, such as a computing system built abroad. See IFR. The usual de minimis rule does not apply, i.e. the de minimis threshold for U.S.-origin content does not take these items outside the control. Companies therefore cannot avoid the license requirement by building controlled chips into foreign-made hardware destined for a restricted data center.
The license requirement for the five countries listed in the IFR do not apply to semiconductors destined to companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, the United States, provided certain reporting requirements are met.
License applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Items that become eligible for a license exception are subject to the terms and conditions of the applicable license exception and the restrictions in § 740.2 of the EAR.
Interagency Authorship
Notably, although BIS issued the rule, the rule was written by, and issued at the direction of, the Department of the Treasury and the National Security Council, not BIS itself. It also comes after BIS officials had questioned whether the agency had the statutory authority to impose remote access controls at all, a question that Congress has been weighing in the Remote Access Security Act.
BIS Is Accepting Public Comments
As this is an Interim Final Rule, BIS is accepting comments from interested parties until January 19, 2027.
For additional background on past actions on this AI issue, see Thompson Hine Update of May 14, 2025 and Update of January 21, 2025.
